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 Chapter 36 
 Origins and Evolution of Religion 
from a Darwinian Point of View: 
Synthesis of Different Theories 
 Pierrick  Bourrat 
 Abstract  The religious phenomenon is a complex one in many respects. In recent 
years an increasing number of theories on the origin and evolution of religion have 
been put  forward. Each one of these theories rests on a Darwinian framework but 
there is a lot of disagreement about which bits of the framework account best for the 
evolution of religion. Is religion primarily a by-product of some adaptation? Is it 
itself an adaptation, and if it is, does it benefi ciate individuals or groups? In this 
chapter, I review a number of theories that link religion to cooperation and show that 
these theories, contrary to what is often suggested in the literature, are not mutually 
exclusive. As I present each theory, I delineate an integrative framework that allows 
distinguishing the explanandum of each theory. Once this is done, it becomes clear 
that some theories provide good explanations for the origin of religion but not so 
good explanations for its maintenance and vice versa. Similarly some explanations 
are good explanations for the evolution of religious individual level traits but not so 
good explanations for traits hard to defi ne at the individual level. I suggest that to 
fully understand the religious phenomenon, integrating in a systematic way the dif-
ferent theories and the data is a more successful approach. 
1  Introduction 
 Over the last 15 years, the religious phenomenon has sparked an increasing interest 
among evolutionists. Although there is only one Darwinian Theory of evolution, 
there is a myriad of theories proposing an evolutionary and Darwinian explanation 
of the origin and evolution of religious beliefs and practices. An obvious reason to 
this is that religion is an extremely complex phenomenon which can be carved not 
only in different cultural traits that can themselves be studied independently, but 
also from different points of view. Indeed, one can study rituals, beliefs in super-
natural  entities or the economical aspects of religions which all belong to the 
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phenomenon of religion. Matching with these different aspects of religion, some 
theories focus more on the cognitive aspect of religion while others see the phenom-
enon from a larger perspective. Yet, the complexity of the phenomenon is not the 
only reason for the numerous Darwinian theories of religion. Another reason is 
sociological. Although all of these theories claim to be Darwinian, they have been 
developed in different fi elds. Some come from evolutionary biology, others from 
psychology, cognitive sciences, anthropology or economics. Those fi elds compre-
hend Darwinism in different ways. For example, a postulate of evolutionary 
 psychology is that many of the human psychological adaptations have been shaped 
in an ancestral environment which was very different from our modern setting. This 
would have led some of our behaviors to be mismatched with the modern environ-
ment. However, this is not a postulate of human behavioral ecology or evolutionary 
anthropology. Indeed, in these fi elds it is postulated that our modern behaviors are 
optimal from an adaptive point of view (relatively to some tradeoffs an organism 
cannot avoid). These different ways of conceptualizing evolutionary mechanisms 
and Darwinism have subsequently led to different paradigms when religion has 
started to be a hot topic in evolutionary sciences. 
 Aside from their number, another remarkable fact of the Darwinian theories of 
religion is that they are often presented as incompatible or mutually exclusive. 
For example, according to different theories, the beliefs in supernatural agents are 
 either a byproduct of our social evolution  or an adaptation. And among the adap-
tive theories, these beliefs are  either individual adaptations with the function of 
maintaining one’s reputation  or group adaptations with the function of reinforcing 
social cohesion. This kind of divergence is, I have already noted, partially explained 
by the different origins of the Darwinian theories of religion. Yet, in many cases, 
I will show that these oppositions are fallacious. In fact, it is possible to integrate 
the different theories if one pays attention to what explanatory level, level of orga-
nization and temporal scale they operate at. At the end of the chapter, I will argue 
that each of these oppositions is often the result of a lack of precision in the phe-
nomena explained the theories. While being rarely expressed, some theories explain 
 the origin of some religious phenomena while other theories explain some reli-
gious phenomena in  an actual context . Similarly, the different theories study one 
and the same phenomenon using different scales, whether spatial or temporal. 
More generally, this chapter will be an integrative synthesis of the different 
Darwinian theories of religion. The integration I will propose will have the benefi -
cial effect to palliate different problems encountered by each separate theory while 
still keeping their explanatory power. Although some research has been conducted 
in order to treat several levels of organization at once with religion (see for example 
Johnson and Bering  2009 ; Roes and Raymond  2003 ; Sosis and Alcorta  2003 ; Sosis 
et al.  2007 ), more work needs to be done in order to understand the articulation of 
these different levels. My aim in this chapter will be an attempt to make this articu-
lation. For each theory I present, I will ask the following questions “Does this 
theory give an explanation of a phenomenon encountered in religions or does it 
provide an explanation of the stabilization of this phenomenon?” or “Can this 
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 theory be treated  independently from any other or does it relate to (even implicitly) 
parts of other theories?” 
 This synthesis, however, will not be exhaustive. There are at least two reasons for 
that. First, disagreements within each discipline exist and presenting them would 
exceed the scope of this chapter. Second, among the different perspectives one can 
adopt on religion, my synthesis will mostly focus on cooperation. Indeed, many 
theories propose that one of the evolutionary functions of religion is to increase 
cooperation between individuals. The problem of cooperation is one of the most 
important in evolutionary sciences and focusing on religion from this point of view 
is up to now the most fertile research program involving Darwinian Theory. 
However, it would be inaccurate to claim it is the only one. 
 The theories I will examine will be classifi ed in three categories. The fi rst 
 category is the by-product theory of religion (Barrett  2000 ; Boyer  2001 ; Boyer and 
Ramble  2001 ) which is undeniably the most popular and also the strongest from an 
empirical point of view. According to this theory, the religious phenomenon, or 
more precisely the beliefs in supernatural agents, is not an adaptation. Rather, its 
proponents believe it is a by-product of other adaptations to sociality. Another cor-
pus of theories, on the contrary, seeks to explain the religious phenomena as past or 
actual adaptations. These theories are the theories stemming from Evolutionary 
Psychology (Dennett  2006 ), the fear of supernatural punishment theory (Johnson 
and Bering  2009 ), the costly signaling theory of religion (Alcorta and Sosis  2005 ; 
Cronk  1994 ; Sosis and Alcorta  2003 ; Sosis et al.  2007 ) and the kleptocracy theory 
(Diamond  1997 ). Finally, a third type of theories sees religion from a multilevel and 
adaptive point of view. In particular, they consider the group level as a privileged 
level upon which selection is acting (Roes and Raymond  2003 ; Snarey  1996 ; Wilson 
 2002 ,  2005 ). Following the three types of theories I have just pointed out, the 
remainder of this chapter will be divided into three sections. The fi rst section will 
focus on the by- product theory of religion, while sections two and three will focus 
on adaptive theories of religion that regard the individual and the group as the privi-
leged level of selection respectively. In sections two and three, the theories I will 
present are solutions to the problem of cooperation. I will show that schematically 
there are two potential solutions involving religion with the problem of cooperation. 
These solutions match with the theories focusing on the individual and those focus-
ing on the group. The fi rst solution proposes that an individual cooperate because 
their reputation is involved. If they do not cooperate, their reputation and conse-
quently their fi tness might suffer from it. The second solution focuses on the idea 
that selection operates at the level of the group. Individuals cooperate because it 
increases group fi tness, sometimes at the expense of their own fi tness. If they do not, 
their group might get extinct or be outcompeted by another one. The division 
between these two forms of adaptive theories will be very schematic. Indeed, soon 
I will show that in some theories the level upon which selection acts will be diffi cult 
to delimitate; it will be  possible to conceive that individuals cooperate both for 
themselves and their group. 
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2  The By-product Theory of Religion 
 I will fi rst present the by-product theory of religion, which was originally developed 
within the fi eld of cognitive sciences. It proposes that the beliefs in supernatural 
agents are principally the consequence of selective pressure cognitive traits which 
are (or were) critical for the survival of individuals in their environment, rather than 
an adaptation. Buss et al. ( 1998 , p. 537) defi ne by-products as “[…] characteristics 
that do not solve adaptive problems and do not have to have functional design. They 
are carried along with characteristics that do have functional design because they 
happen to be coupled with those adaptations.” In the present, case with belief in 
supernatural agents, two traits or characteristics have been distinguished. 
2.1  Two Critical Traits 
 The fi rst of these two traits is what Justin Barrett ( 2000 ) calls Hypersensitive Agency 
Detection Device (HADD). This expression comes from an argument developed by 
Stewart Guthrie who proposes that humans are naturally predisposed to detect 
agents in their environment when such agents do not actually exist (Barrett  2000 ; 
Guthrie  1993 ; Tremlin  2006 ). One classical example given by Stewart Guthrie 
( 1993 ) is the clouds one can sometimes see shaped as faces, a phenomenon which 
gave the title to his book. According to Guthrie, such a perceptual device (although 
biased) could have been adaptive in our evolutionary past. Indeed, in an uncertain 
environment failing to detect an agent could have had much more dramatic conse-
quences for survival than detecting an agent where there was none. Let us imagine, 
for example, that this agent is an enemy or a predator: failing to notice its presence 
in time could be fatal. An analogy between this type of cognitive bias and a fi re 
alarm can be made. If a fi re alarm is very sensitive and goes off very often, even 
when there is no fi re, it will always be a better alarm than an alarm which does not 
go off when there is a fi re. Because of this asymmetry, one should expect a fi re 
alarm to be designed in a way that it goes off more often than there are fi res. 
Following the same reasoning but applying it to an evolutionary context, one should 
expect that humans (and other organisms) detect agents in their environment more 
often than there actually are. Beliefs in supernatural agents would be the result of a 
manifestation of this cognitive bias. 
 The second trait, which together with HADD makes belief in supernatural agents 
possible, is the theory of mind module. Theory of mind is defi ned as the ability for 
one individual to impute mental states to others (Premack and Woodruff  1978 ). For 
obvious reasons, this ability is crucial for humans. Although there is no or little 
research made on this topic, it seems that people who do not have it or possess it in 
a very limited way, such as autistic people (Baron-Cohen  1995 ; Bloom  2004 ; Pinker 
 1997 ), develop beliefs in God which are very different from the majority of us. 
These beliefs do not imply the existence of God as a supernatural agent but more as 
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a force or general principle (Atran  2002 ; Bering  2002 ; Tremlin  2006 ). The key point 
with the theory of mind and its relation to supernatural agents is that it suggests that 
humans are predisposed to conceptualize anthropomorphically the supernatural 
agents in which they believe, in other words, with human traits and preoccupations. 
For example, Barrett and Keil ( 1996 ) have shown that when students who claim not 
to have an anthropomorphic understanding of God, were asked to answer very 
quickly to questions about its supernatural powers, they were shaping their answer 
anthropomorphically. In fact, although the participants of this experiment had a 
conception of God as omnipotent (i.e. non-anthropomorphic) in their religion, when 
they had to answer quickly and intuitively to some questions about God, their 
answers showed that they were not conceptualizing it as omnipotent as they were 
claiming. Rather they thought of God as being able to execute only one action at a 
time (i.e. anthropomorphic). 
 Boyer ( 2001 ), from a rather anthropological background, and Barrett ( 2004 ), 
from an experimental psychological background, both propose a detailed account of 
the by-product theory of religion. 
2.2  Religion Is Too Complex to Be Only a By-product 
 Although very young, the Cognitive Science of Religion from which the by-product 
theory of religion emerged, could become extremely fertile in the near future 
because it proposes new approaches to study religion. Yet, one can detect a limit to 
this approach and more specifi cally to the by-product theory: whereas it can provide 
an explanation of the emergence or the origins of some religious behaviors and 
beliefs, its explanatory power plummets when one tries to explain why supernatural 
agents, religions and rituals can sometimes be so elaborated. Let’s recall the defi ni-
tion of a by-product from Buss et al. ( 1998 ) given earlier. If one follows this defi ni-
tion and subscribes to the by-product theory, beliefs in supernatural agents are  only 
a by-product of HADD and of the Theory of Mind module. However, it is legitimate 
to question why, on top of their anthropomorphic characteristics, those agents have 
other characteristics such as being all-powerful, benevolent or having created the 
universe etc. The proposition that religion is only a by-product of the architecture of 
our mind (directly inherited from our evolutionary past) implicitly commits us to 
deny that from the emergence of those by-products, natural selection did act upon 
them. Yet, it seems  a priori reasonable to think that some processes of natural selec-
tion whether biological or cultural did happen since then. Some characteristics of 
supernatural agents are observed with regularity and transculturally, and they do not 
seem to have no direct links either with the HADD or with the Theory of Mind 
module. It is moreover diffi cult to conceive how these characteristics could  only be 
cognitive by- products. The theories that I will examine in sections two and three 
propose precisely that the different patterns one can observe are adaptations or at 
least have an adaptive role in human societies. Thus, by-product theory – although 
an important hypothesis for the origin of religion and a starting point for other 
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evolutionary theories of religion – does not allow for a complete explanation of the 
beliefs in supernatural agents, let alone the religious phenomenon in its totality. 
3  Adaptive Theories at the Individual Level 
3.1  Religion as an Ancestral Adaptation 
Which Is Not Anymore: “Sweet-Tooth” 
Theories of Religion 
 “Sweet-tooth theories of religion” is a label given by Daniel Dennett ( 2006 ) to a 
body of evolutionary theories on religious beliefs and practices. The main idea 
behind this label is that religion has incorporated some characteristics which were 
adaptive in our evolutionary past, but nowadays they are not anymore. Dennett com-
pares religions to the sweet and fatty foods most of us like, which were probably 
rare for our ancestors. There is little doubt that such food was providing a selective 
advantage to the individuals who had access to it. Yet, in our modern environment, 
this kind of food is not rare anymore and have deleterious effects (such as hypercho-
lesterolemia, diabetes etc.) if consumed in excessive quantities. In spite of this mis-
match, it is still attractive for us. Mismatch theory is a classical concept of 
evolutionary psychology. A mismatch occurs when an individual is not adapted to 
its environment any more. The cause of the mismatch is that the environment has 
evolved too quickly for new adaptive solutions to be found. We can use the idea that 
we are not adapted to our modern environment rich in sweet and fatty food, in 
regards to religion. In fact, it is possible to conceive religious beliefs and practices 
as costly or neutral (from an evolutionary point of view) nowadays, when they incite 
individuals to cooperate more. An individual may incur net costs by cooperating in 
an anonymous society where no one else cooperates. However, cooperating through 
the means of religion may have been evolutionarily advantageous when conditions 
where different. Advantages may have been, for example, to allow for a better coop-
eration within small groups of individuals, so that beliefs and practices which made 
cooperation easier would have been selected. Subsequently, according to sweet 
tooth theories, because the environmental conditions have suddenly changed, the 
beliefs and religious practices lost their adaptedness (that is, their function in social 
cohesion) but remained attractive for the human mind. Thus, under this view, 
Christianity, Judaism or Islam could be seen as cultural phenomena which have 
been invented and selected by humans because they reunite a combination of attrac-
tive ideas, yet they would have no evolutionary function nowadays. To push our 
analogy between food and religion a little further, our sweet tooth and taste for fatty 
food pushed humans to create and eat fast food which has a lot of success all around 
the world in spite of its deleterious effects. Similarly, our spiritual intuitions which 
were adaptive in the past might have had a great infl uence on our modern religions 
and would simply be a very good synthesis of the different traits which were one 
day adaptive. 
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 This idea fi ts perfectly with the framework of Evolutionary Psychology and 
would deserve further developments more. Yet, Dennett does not point out any pre-
cise study confi rming his ideas. Indeed, he remains rather vague on the potential 
function religion might have had. Although it might be diffi cult to test hypothesis 
about the past, it is worth verifying the compatibility of those hypotheses with the 
different evolutionary scenarios of human evolution. But even if research could be 
done, it would have to show that religion does not have any infl uence on fi tness 
nowadays. The same demonstration would also need to be done with the by-product 
theory of religion. But in the latter case it would be less problematic since the by-
product theory makes almost no assumptions on the ancestral environment in which 
beliefs in supernatural agents did appear except that it was a social one. Finally, 
although it seems quite probable and reasonable to think that some religious traits 
have been adaptive in our evolutionary past, it seems equally reasonable to think, as 
I already mentioned in the previous section, that the same or new religious traits are 
adaptive today. Indeed, some authors consider the by-product and sweet-tooth theo-
ries as insuffi cient to fully explain the religious phenomena, and argue that some 
religious traits do have an adaptive role nowadays. 
3.2  Religion as a Contemporary Adaptive 
Phenomenon at the Individual Level 
3.2.1  The Fear of Supernatural Punishment Theory 
 The fear of supernatural punishment theory, mainly defended by Jesse Bering and 
Dominic Johnson (Johnson  2005 ; Johnson and Bering  2009 ), also has its roots in 
cognitive sciences. The Theory of Mind and HADD have, according to this theory, 
strictly the same role that in the by-product theory. However, this theory takes into 
account a new constraint on evolutionary dynamic which is different from all the 
constraints the by-product theory assumes, namely language. This constraint is the 
most important pillar of the fear of supernatural punishment theory. Bering and 
Johnson propose that together with the birth of human language and Theory of 
Mind, reputation becomes an essential characteristic of humans. According to them, 
language permits a rapid dispersal of ideas and information of the type “who did 
what”. The emergence of human-like language would hence impose  nolens volens 
new selective pressures on individuals through the reputation they acquire. A bad 
reputation is extremely disadvantageous and cooperation might be a strategy which 
would mitigate this problem by preventing an individual from acquiring such a rep-
utation. Although it can be costly to cooperate, the net balance between the costs 
and benefi ts of cooperation is often positive in contexts where reputation is 
important. 
 Starting from these hypotheses, Johnson and Bering propose that beliefs in 
supernatural agents are means to avoid the consequences of a bad reputation by 
increasing individual’s cooperation. Let us recall that HADD and the Theory of 
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Mind module are responsible for the concepts of anthropomorphic supernatural 
agents. The HADD erroneously recognizes agents in the environment and the 
Theory of Mind gives these agents human-like intentions. Let us now posulate that 
an individual believes that an ancestor, or any other supernatural agent they believe 
in, will punish them if they act antisocially within their community. Johnson and 
Bering consider that, on average, such an individual will acquire a better reputation 
relatively to another individual who does not have these beliefs since the former, 
because of their fear in supernatural punishment, will have an incentive to have less 
antisocial behaviors. This will lead our individual to have a fi tness—classically 
defi ned as the product of the survival and reproduction— ceteris paribus superior to 
an individual who does not have such beliefs. If those beliefs are heritable, they will 
be transmitted to the next generations and selected by natural selection because of 
the selective advantage they procure: if an individual believes they are constantly 
observed by someone, as it could be the case if they believe in the existence of a god 
who can punish them, their incentive (whether conscious or unconscious) to be 
prosocial 1 will be strong since they will feel monitored by this god. However, such 
constraint is not imposed on individuals who do not have beliefs in supernatural 
agents, and although they might overall be prosocial, they will be more likely to be 
caught while committing acts of selfi sh behavior which will damage their reputation 
and, as a result, reduce their fi tness. 
 The fear of supernatural punishment theory seems at fi rst glance promising and 
contrary to sweet-tooth theory easily testable. As a matter of fact, Johnson and 
Bering claim that this theory has an empirical support (Bering et al.  2005 ; Johnson 
 2005 ). Yet, it has many limits and its testability is an extremely delicate matter. 
Enumerating these limits here would be beyond the scope of this article, and for that 
reason I will restrain my analysis to the most important of them (for more details on 
these limits see: Bourrat et al.  2011 ). One of the most important limits of Johnson 
and Bering’s ideas is that they are presented as a theory in which the only important 
level of selection is the individual level. Yet, reputation is only a strong constraint for 
a given individual with the members of the group she interacts with. In fact, it intui-
tively seems much more problematic when your neighbor has a bad opinion about 
you rather than someone you do not know and who lives 3,000 km away. Once this 
remark is taken into account seriously, it becomes clear that the fear of supernatural 
punishment theory can be of great help for understanding beliefs in moralizing 
supernatural agents from a Darwinian point of view, but only in the context of 
unique or isolated groups. Nowadays, the context is different, numerous groups of 
individuals with different beliefs exist and virtually none of them is isolated. The 
fear of supernatural punishment theory as proposed by Bering and Johnson is insuf-
fi cient to give an account of all the characteristics linked to cooperation and the 
beliefs of the different supernatural agents one can observe in different groups. This 
theory can hardly explain why different human groups have beliefs in different 
supernatural agents and punishments or why the supernatural punishments believed 
in one group are not believed as threatening in other groups. At best, the fear of 
1  By “prosocial” here I mean “having a propensity to cooperate with others”. 
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supernatural punishment theory is part of a larger explanation of the evolution of 
beliefs in supernatural agents. That said, it is more refi ned when compared to the 
by-product theory because it provides a partial explanation of why humans often 
believe in supernatural agents who have moral virtues and are inclined to punish. 
 Another limit to this theory comes from its mitigated empirical results. Johnson 
( 2005 ) has tested it transculturally using a database of 186 societies and with more 
than 2,000 variables. Some of them were linked to religious and supernatural beliefs 
while other being were to cooperation. As he claims, the results reinforce the 
hypothesis of fear of supernatural punishment as a mechanism explaining (at least 
partially) the different levels of cooperation, whether it occurs directly between 
individuals (e.g., not robbing your neighbor) or are institutionalized (e.g., the exis-
tence of a currency or a police as part of the society). Bourrat et al. ( 2011 ) have 
tested this hypothesis again using the same database, but they started with the prem-
ise that the fear of supernatural punishment hypothesis should be valid not only for 
supernatural agents which are not gods or ancestors (while Johnson was only con-
sidering high gods) but also for any other forms of supernatural punishment, as 
Johnson and Krüger ( 2004 ) initially proposed it. Indeed, no criteria in the theory can 
justify a special treatment for  religious supernatural  agents . Bourrat and colleagues 
also underlined that the theory can only account for the direct cooperation between 
individuals and not for institutional cooperation. The results they obtained could not 
confi rm the fear of supernatural punishment hypothesis. That said, they consider 
that the anthropological database they used is not fi ne-grained and precise enough 
to detect personal beliefs. Atkinson and Bourrat ( 2011 ) have therefore tested this 
hypothesis yet again, using a database reporting personal beliefs. Their result seems 
to support the fear of supernatural punishment hypothesis in its broader version, that 
is, which is not limited only to supernatural agents. 
3.2.2  The Costly Signaling Theory Applied to Religion 
 The costly signaling theory applied to religion focuses on another specifi c aspect of 
the religious phenomenon, namely rituals. However, this theory has been developed 
from the perspective of cooperation, similarly to the theories I have discussed 
earlier. 
 The costly signaling theory has been developed mostly by evolutionary biolo-
gists and has its roots in the work of John Krebs and Richard Dawkins (Dawkins 
and Krebs  1978 ; Krebs and Dawkins  1984 ) on manipulation of signals, and of 
Amotz Zahavi ( 1975 ) on the handicap principle. Krebs and Dawkins propose that 
signals should be seen as attempts to manipulate individuals rather than attempts to 
inform them. This idea is one of the pillars of Dawkins’ concept of extended pheno-
type (Dawkins  1982 ), in which the phenotype of an individual is not only the direct 
expression of their genes, but also the way this individual modifi es their environ-
ment including others’ behaviors. In a revised version of the manipulation of signals 
theory, Krebs and Dawkins ( 1984 ) defend the idea that the use of signals should be 
regarded as manipulative or cooperative attempts depending on signaler and receiver 
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individuals’ interests. When signalers and receivers do not have overlapping 
 interests, receivers should undergo strong selection pressure to detect and resist the 
attempt of manipulation from the signaler. In return, this should create a selective 
pressure on signalers to develop new strategies of manipulating the receivers and so 
forth  ad infi nitum . This phenomenon is typical of arm races such as described by the 
Red Queen Hypothesis (Van Valen  1973 ). Krebs and Dawkins argue that when sig-
nalers and receivers have overlapping interests, the signal is expected to be simpler: 
manipulation is not in the evolutionary interests of the signaler since it is also in the 
interests of the receiver to cooperate. 
 The handicap principle proposes, among other things, that males, in a context of 
sexual selection, should display their qualities to females by infl icting a cost to 
themselves (Zahavi  1975 ; hence the name of the principle). For example the long 
peacock tail displayed by males is very costly to have. Nevertheless, because a long 
and colorful tail increases the chances for an individual to be predated and is costly 
to produce and maintain, a peacock male with such a tail signals to females that in 
spite of this handicap it has been able to survive. A female choosing to mate with 
this male consequently selects his qualities. 
 In the framework of Krebs and Dawkins, the handicap principle matches with a 
case of cooperation between signalers and receivers (hence no arm race between 
them is expected), but in a context of possible defection. Indeed, Krebs and 
Dawkins draw their attention to many cases of signals where imitation is impossi-
ble, because there is an indispensable link between the signal and the underlying 
necessary condition for it to exist. This is the case, for example, between body size 
and frequency of vocal signals. In this case, no arm race between signalers is 
expected since no “cheap” imitation will be convincing. Yet, as suggested by 
Zahavi ( 1975 ), even when such a link between the signal and the underlying condi-
tion for this signal does not exist naturally, signals which are costly to produce 
would be honest signals for the receivers and would allow them to distinguish good 
quality signals from bad quality ones. In those conditions, a signal will be honest 
if and only if the cost of imitation is as or more important than the benefi ts that 
would be received from that imitation (Grafen  1990 ) and an arm race between 
signalers is expected until a point where only some individuals can pay the costs. 
This idea precisely fi ts the case of the peacock tail. There is no direct trait naturally 
measuring the propensity of a male to avoid predators. Yet, the cost of producing a 
long tail becomes a reliable signal for females who will choose the males with the 
longest tails. 
 Several scholars have proposed to apply these ideas to human rituals (Cronk 
 1994 ; Irons  1996 ; Sosis and Alcorta  2003 ). They suggest that the function of ritu-
als is to promote cooperation within a group, community or society which will 
only be possible if the rituals are costly to exercise. For example, we can fi nd 
frightening or painful rites of passage ceremonies, including tattooing and scarifi -
cation in numerous societies. These rituals, as well as many others, can be inter-
preted as signals displaying a commitment to the community or wider society. 
Individuals undergoing them show that they truly want to be part of the  community 
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since they are willing to pay a price for it. By doing so they demonstrate that in 
future they will not free ride when it will be possible since the cost of free riding 
would be superior to the cost undergone during the ceremony or ritual. For 
instance, Sosis et al. ( 2007 ) have proposed that the tattoos, genital mutilations and 
scarifi cation that some men undergo during different rituals signal the belonging 
to a group. When a man accepts to be marked by tattoos, scarifi cation and mutila-
tions, it will be impossible for him to move from the group to another one in 
future. Indeed with the permanent mark of the group he belonged initially it would 
be very hard for him to be accepted in another group in full trust. Hence, these 
defi nitive marks represent reliable signals of future cooperation since being banned 
from a group would be extremely costly. However, a signal can be costly in differ-
ent ways: the same absolute cost can be undergone in one shot, as it is the case 
with initiations, or undergone over time, as it is the case with rituals such as catho-
lic masses (cost in terms of time spent). These two “types” of costs perfectly cor-
relate with the two forms of religiosity one can fi nd transculturally: “doctrinal” 
and “imagistic”(Atkinson and Whitehouse  2011 ; Whitehouse  2004 ). In a doctrinal 
mode, religiosity is acquired through the practices of frequent but low arousal ritu-
als such as masses. In the imagistic mode, religiosity is acquired through the prac-
tices of highly arousing but very infrequent rituals, such as initiations which 
individuals remember all their life. 
 The costly signaling theory applied to rituals has a promising explanatory 
power and there is already interesting research suggesting its value. This is the 
case with the work of Richard Sosis and his colleagues (Sosis et al.  2007 ) on scari-
fi cations and on American communities in the nineteenth century (Sosis  2000 ; 
Sosis and Bressler  2003 ). Furthermore, the costly signaling theory can be applied 
to a vast range of human behaviors and in different contexts. In the fi eld of reli-
gion, for example, Terence Deacon ( 1997 ) proposes that the commitment of 
women to religion such as Christianity or Judaism, in some societies, could be an 
honest signal of their fi delity. The rationale behind this idea is that pious women 
should be, in principle, more reluctant to be unfaithful than other women. The fear 
of supernatural punishment could be, in this case, the underlying mechanism of 
some honest religious signals. As there is no direct observable expression of fi del-
ity, piety can be one proxy for it. Hence, demonstrations of piety are expected to 
be stronger and more explicit when the fi delity of women is under selection pres-
sure. This prediction is supported by the research of Boster et al. ( 1998 ) on cer-
tainty of paternity which is superior with Jewish priests. The authors argue that the 
laws of sexual purity to whish Jewish women are committed is the reason of this 
result. Such commitment can be translated in terms of costly signals as Sosis and 
Alcorta ( 2003 ) do. That said, this theory which comes directly from behavioral 
ecology and mostly focuses on the biological individual has some limits. For 
example, it is hard to conceive why some cultural traits increasing the fi tness of 
individuals on the long term (such as rituals) would be so widespread in human 
societies without invoking a form of cultural group selection. I will come back to 
this problem in the fourth section. 
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3.2.3  The Kleptocracy Theory of Religion 
 The kleptocracy theory, although being very general, is not a theory of religious 
beliefs and practices that one can apply to any society, unlike the theories we exam-
ined thus far. Rather, it focuses on the evolution of religion in agrarian societies, the 
only ones in which an important social stratifi cation is possible. The concept of 
kleptocracy has its roots in the Marxist argument proposing that religion is created 
by the societies’ elites in order to materially exploit the people who only receive the 
secondary or derived benefi ts of a low but constant level of security and productivity 
(Atran  2002 ). 
 According to Jared Diamond (Diamond  1997 ), the “true” religions only emerge 
when a central authority assimilates the beliefs in the supernatural in order to estab-
lish a pyramidal scam. Supernatural agents, in this case, can be conceived as a mean 
of reinforcing the power of kleptocrates (the ruling elite). The vast majority of indi-
viduals is exploited by them, but this system of exploitation is cooperative. 
Kleptocrates maintain the social cohesion of the group by force directly, but also 
and more importantly most the people truly believe that the ruling elite have a direct 
link with their god(s). Thus, this justifi es their privileged position. It is almost cer-
tain that in past or present societies, the elite are healthier than other individuals (see 
Diamond  1987 ), especially in agrarian systems where food storing is the rule. 
Another demonstration of elite’s privileged position is Laura Betzig’s research 
( 1986 ), which demonstrated transculturally with the help of anthropological data 
that the level of despotism is positively correlated to the size of harems in a society. 
Hence, we can imply that the fi tness of the elite is usually superior to the fi tness of 
the people in those societies. 
 Let us note that kleptocracy theory is compatible with the fear of supernatural 
punishment theory. This will be the case if one given individual believes that they 
will be punished by a god if they do not obey their monarch or sovereign. However, 
the fear of supernatural punishment is only one of the possible mechanisms that can 
reinforce obedience and submission, since cooperation between individuals might 
as well be the result of threats and direct punishments from the elite. Likewise, the 
enforcement of rituals might increase cooperation between individuals, as it has 
been recently argued: the synchronization of movements one can observe during 
rituals would have such an effect on people (Wiltermuth and Heath  2009 ). These 
two examples, which show how the elite can exploit the people for them to cooper-
ate using religion as a justifi cation, are however far from being exhaustive. 
 Although kleptocracy theory is very general and potentially embeds some theo-
ries I already examined, one question remains unanswered. If a kleptocracy 
decreases the fi tness of most individuals but the elite, why were there so many klep-
tocracies in human history and why have they been so successful? One possible 
answer I propose is that the fi tness of an individual in a kleptocratic society, in spite 
of being lower when compared to the fi tness of an individual in a non-kleptocratic 
society, will become higher when the two societies will be in competition with each 
other. Indeed, a centralized power such as the one we can encounter in kleptocratic 
societies allows for the cooperation of a higher number of individuals which are 
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more specialized (e.g. army, farmers etc.) than in a non kleptocratic society. These 
two parameters are critical when there is an intergroup competition (Alexander 
 1987 ). I will come back later to this point in the next section. 
 One of the strengths of kelptocracy theory is that it can allow the integration of 
many other theories from different fi elds, whether cognitive sciences, ecology or evo-
lutionary sciences, but it is also one of its weaknesses since it makes it extremely hard 
to test precisely and in its totality. Another important point to note is that although this 
theory can give an account of the origin of “true religions” as defi ned by Diamond, 
the theory cannot explain why a kleptocratic society will be successful over time if 
one does not consider at least two levels of selection: the individual level and the 
group level. Diamond himself accounts for such possibility and proposes that a form 
of group selection could explain the success of kleptocratic societies (Diamond  1997 ). 
4  Adaptive Theories at the Group Level 
 Individual level selection explanations have been privileged by evolutionary biol-
ogy for more than 30 years (Wilson and Wilson  2007 ). However, many authors 
agree that major transitions took place in evolution. A major transition in evolution 
can be defi ned as the emergence of a new property that has dramatic consequences 
on the course of evolution. One family of major transitions is evolutionary transi-
tions in individuality. An evolutionary transition in individuality is the result of the 
emergence of a new kind of individual from the cooperation of lower- level individu-
als (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry  1995 ; Michod  1999 ; Okasha  2006 ). The emer-
gence of human language and culture is sometimes considered as the most recent 
evolutionary transition in individuality since it seems possible that the human coop-
eration leads to the formation of news “cultural” individuals in competition at the 
level of societies, namely human “superorganisms”. 
 Until now, all the theories I have examined propose an explanation of the  religious 
phenomena at the individual level, which implicitly or explicitly rests upon the con-
cept of gene. Yet, we have seen the limits of these theories to explain the diversity 
of religions, whether it is diversity in supernatural agents, in rituals or supernatural 
punishments, which can be very different from one society to the other. To fi ll the 
gap between these gene-centered theories and the diversity of religious phenomena, 
it seems necessary to postulate some mechanisms of cultural evolution and selection 
in order to get more complete picture of the evolution of religion. This is exactly 
what David Sloan-Wilson (Wilson  2002 ,  2005 ) proposes. According to him, the 
evolutionary function of religion is essentially to favor the production of common 
goods within group and to diminish their costs through the altruistic cooperation of 
individuals belonging to one and the same group. This leads to the emergence of an 
intergroup competition when more than one group can be considered (direct com-
petition if the groups are in contact and indirect if they are not). According to 
Wilson, it is hence perfectly legitimate to consider whether actual forms of religion 
are cultural adaptation at the group level. 
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 Wilson confi rms his hypotheses using detailed case studies (Wilson  2002 ) and an 
analysis of 35 religions (Wilson  2005 ) randomly chosen in an encyclopedia of 
Religion. Although he recognizes the value and plausibility of the other Darwinian 
hypotheses we examined so far, he dismisses them one by one showing that none of 
them is able to provide a full explanation of the phenomena linked to the religious 
practices and beliefs. He propels his ideas with the introduction of the notions of 
cultural group selection and gene-culture coevolution (Richerson and Boyd  2005 ). In 
order to understand the interaction between genes and cultural items one has to 
notice that ultimately they have a common fate since they depend (in a different way) 
on the same interactor, namely the human biological individual. However, genes and 
cultural items (sometimes called memes) are fundamentally different on one point. 
Genes are prisoners of their interactors (or their “vehicles”, to use Dawkins’ termi-
nology) except during an event of reproduction. Yet, that is not the case for cultural 
entities which can easily pass from one individual to the other during an act of com-
munication. From this standpoint, we can understand culture from an epidemiologi-
cal point of view. Indeed, models of cultural evolution based on the idea of contagion 
can be derived from models of virulence (Laland et al.  2000 ), since the cultural enti-
ties face the same constraints as biological parasites. For example, the practice of a 
transmissible religious altruistic behavior will successfully spread within a group if 
the cost of this practice (in terms of its fi tness) is compensated by the number of 
“infected” individuals of this practice. Now, the number of individuals infected by 
the practice will depend on the number of individuals available in the population. In 
an ideal (thus unrealistic) case of population with infi nite size and infi nite density, 
biological and cultural evolutions could be strictly decoupled from each other. It 
would not matter in this case that the practice leads to the death of the “infected” 
individual if the number of available individuals is infi nite and some of them adopt 
the practice. In this case, culture would impose no constraints on individual fi tness. 
Yet, real populations are neither infi nite nor infi nitely dense. Consequently one given 
individual has a limited access to other individuals. Under such conditions, humans 
can be considered as a limited resource from the point of view of the cultural entities. 
On the short term, a cultural practice can spread quickly in spite of an important cost 
imposed to the individuals who display this practice, but it will sooner or later lead 
to the extinction of the population since no more individuals will be present in the 
surrounding of the “infected” individuals and the cost of the practice will not be 
compensated by a high level of transmission. On the contrary, a practice that, on 
average, allows for an increase in individuals’ fi tness will persist and will be trans-
mitted over time since new individuals will always be available. 
 Once these considerations are taken into account, the relevance of multilevel 
selection and, more specifi cally, group selection of cultural items, becomes obvious. 
Ideas pass from one individual to the other within a cooperative group. Differences 
in religious practices between groups can lead to the differential persistence of these 
groups over time and potentially to their differential growth and “reproduction”. 
Proselytism, wows of chastity, hostilities or intolerance towards other  religious 
groups are all potential adaptive traits that are better explained from a long term 
cultural groups perspective, in spite of the short term individual cost. 
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 To conclude this section, I will briefl y present three studies which have directly 
or indirectly tested theories of intergroup competition by considering some traits 
linked to religion as cultural adaptations. The fi rst one has been made by Snarey 
( 1996 ). Using an ethnographic database of several hundreds of variables and societ-
ies, he demonstrates that the beliefs in moralizing high gods (by “high” he means 
being an all-powerful and/or creator of the universe) is positively correlated with the 
dryness of the environment. Snarey suggests that the fact of believing in all power-
ful and moralizing god increases the cooperation between individuals in environ-
ments where the problem of water availability existed in the past or still has an 
important impact on the survival of the societies. Thus the result observed (i.e. the 
correlation between dryness and the presence of high gods in the religion) would be 
due to the elimination or transformation of the societies which did not have such 
beliefs in high gods. 
 The second study was carried by Roes and Raymond ( 2003 ), who used the same 
database and tested different hypotheses. They found that the beliefs in high gods 
were on average found more often in the largest societies (usually found in the rich-
est environments). They propose that the beliefs in high gods allow societies to 
reach a larger size by promoting a better cooperation between individuals and con-
sequently out-competing smaller groups since the size of a society is critical in 
intergroup competition involving confl icts. The mechanism they propose to explain 
the role of the beliefs in high gods and the size of societies is the following. A larger 
society faces problems such as free riding, defection of its individuals as well as the 
risk of splitting in a much more intense way than a smaller society where such prob-
lem can be solved at a local level. The belief in high moralizing gods would allow, 
according to Roes and Raymond, an increase in cooperation between individuals in 
a group, and thereby would lead to the partial solution of the free riding problem. 
This consequently would decrease the risk of scission of this group. Moralizing 
gods would serve, if we follow Roes and Raymond in their reasoning, as social glue. 
 Finally, a third study by Henrich and his collaborators (Henrich et al.  2010 ), has 
tested the impact of belonging to Islam and Christianity (what they name world 
religions) on the fairness of individuals in 15 populations. The study shows, among 
other results, that if the individuals tested belong to one of these two religions there 
is a higher probability that they will behave more fairly than when they belong to a 
local religion. Henrich and collaborators measured fairness using three games clas-
sically used by economists which involve the interaction of two individuals. In the 
fi rst game, named “the dictator game”, one of the two individuals receives a sum of 
money that he or she can choose to share with the other player. He or she can decide 
to keep everything or to divide this sum of money as he wishes. The second player 
has no choice but to accept the amount of money which is given to them. This is not 
the case in the second game, “the ultimatum game” where the second player can 
refuse the amount of money the fi rst player intends to give them. If the second 
player refuses the amount proposed, none of them will receive the money initially 
given by the experimenter. Finally, Henrich and his collaborators created a game 
based on the same principles that the “dictator” and “ultimatum” games, but in 
which the second player can punish the fi rst player by spending some money given 
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to them beforehand if they believes that the proposition made by the fi rst player is 
unfair. From the results they obtain, namely a higher probability to play the games 
fairly by individuals belonging to a world religion, Henrich and his collaborators 
suggest that world religions have coevolved with societies while facilitating large 
scale cooperation. The underlying idea behind this proposition is the concept of 
cultural group selection. 
 None of these three studies outlined above clearly proposes a specifi c mechanism 
involving religion that would reinforce individual cooperation within societies. For 
example, Roes and Raymond use the term “moralizing god” which remains very 
vague. The fear of supernatural punishment theory, the kleptocracy theory and some 
aspects of the costly signaling theory could potentially all be involved in some phe-
nomena of moralization and of large scale cooperation observed by Snarey and Roes 
and Raymond on the one hand, and Henrich and his collaborators on the other hand. 
 None of the theories or hypotheses proposing religion as an adaptation at the 
group level is a theory that gives a historical and cognitive origin of religion. No 
cognitive mechanisms are proposed either in Snarey’s study or in Roes and 
Raymond’s one. Even Wilson, the great architect of the multilevel selection theory, 
neglects some explanations given by the other theories at the individual level which 
are sometimes simpler, more cognitively relevant and which do not involve the 
group level. Yet, as we saw, some questions linked to the diversity of religions, to 
some of their characteristics and to their stabilization over time will remain unan-
swered if they are considered from an individual level perspective only. 
5  Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have proposed that different kinds of Darwinian theories could 
account for the origins and evolution of religious practices and beliefs. I have distin-
guished six theories (or sets of theories) and emphasized wherever possible that 
they are not incompatible since they are not always applicable to the same fi elds, the 
same levels of organization and over the same periods of the human evolution. 
For example, the by-product theory is a  cognitive explanation of the  origin of the 
beliefs in  supernatural agents . The sweet-tooth theory might permit to provide  cog-
nitive explanations of the existence of  deleterious religious  behaviors from a mod-
ern  individualistic perspective if more research was done within this framework. 
The fear of supernatural punishment provides a  cognitive explanation of the  origins 
of beliefs in supernatural  moralizing agents. Kleptocracy and costly signaling theo-
ries respectively provide a p luralistic explanation of the  emergence of the world 
religion and a  behavioral explanation of the  emergence of costly rituals . Finally, 
developing models of multilevel selection would certainly provide solid explana-
tions of the  evolution and  maintenance of the number of the  different religious traits 
and religions in the world. Table  36.1 summarizes all these differences between 
theories. It is now time to acknowledge that the integration will probably be the only 
way of providing the most thorough account on the evolution of Religion. Indeed, 
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we have seen that the fear of supernatural punishment theory to some extent rests on 
the by- product theory. We have also seen that the Kleptocracy theory could be 
linked both to the fear of supernatural punishment theory and consequently to the 
by-product theory but also to the costly signaling theory through the enforcement of 
rituals. Thirdly, the costly signaling theory could be linked to the fear of supernatu-
ral punishment which would provide at least a partial explanation of the reliability 
of some signals (such as being pious). Finally, it seems that the group level theories 
replaced in a multilevel framework are the best candidates to integrate those differ-
ent theories, although one needs to keep in mind that the individual level and the 
cognitive constraints that it imposes need to be at the heart of a multilevel frame-
work (what current group-level theories hardly do). I showed that some explana-
tions, while resting on the individual level, only make sense when they are replaced 
in a more general context involving the existence of other cultural groups. A group 
of individuals is always hard to defi ne, but it seems that if one chooses relevant 
cultural traits, as Sosis, Kress and Boster did in their study on scarifi cations, multi-
level mechanisms integrated in the future models would provide a better general 
understanding of the origins and evolution of religion. The Fig.  36.1 schematically 
summarizes links which exist between the different theories we examined.
 Figure  36.1 and Table  36.1 do not aspire to answer all the problems that would 
need to be solved in order to fully understand the emergence and evolution of reli-
 Table 36.1  Summary of the different theories of the emergence and evolution of religion 
 Theory (proponents)  Explanatory power 
 Level of 
organisation 
privileged 
 Type of 
explanation 
 By-product (Boyer, 
Barrett) 
 Emergence and stabilization 
of beliefs in supernatural 
agents 
 Individual  Cognitive 
 Sweet-tooth (Dennett)  Presence of behaviors 
deleterious for the individual 
in religions 
 Individual  Cognitive 
 Fear of supernatural 
punishment (Johnson 
and Bering) 
 Beliefs in supernatural 
agents concerned with and 
enforcing human morality 
 individual  Cognitive 
 Kleptocracy (Diamond)  Emergence of “pyramidal” 
religion or world religions in 
agrarian societies. part of 
their success in inter- 
societies competition 
 Individual (and 
to some extent 
beyond) 
 Behaviorist with 
pluralist 
tendencies 
 Costly signaling (Sosis, 
Cronk, Irons) 
 Emergence of costly rituals  Individual  Behaviorist 
 Multilevel with focus on 
group level (Wilson; to 
some extent, Roes and 
Raymond; Snarey; 
Henrich et al.) 
 Emergence of some religious 
characteristics such as 
proselytism, stabilization and 
modifi cation of other 
individual religious traits 
 Individual and 
beyond 
 Rather 
behaviorist but 
ideally pluralist 
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gion. However, I aimed at eliminating the direct oppositions and contradictions 
between these theories as well as to show their limits. Religion is an extremely 
complex phenomenon and the Darwinian approach to this phenomenon is still quite 
recent. It seems fair to give each theory involved in its explanation the time to 
develop and to fi nd a consensus with other theories wherever possible. 
 The by-product theory of religion provides a very good non-adaptive cognitive 
explanation of the emergence of beliefs in supernatural agents. The fear of super-
natural punishment theory, in the version proposed by Bering and Johnson, rests on 
the by-product theory but adds an adaptive dimension to the explanation of these 
beliefs. In order to account for their maintenance, a group-level dimension is neces-
sary for this theory which has been build from an individual perspective. The same 
remark can be made both with regards to the kleptocracy and costly signaling theo-
ries. These two theories could be partially anchored to the fear of supernatural pun-
ishment theory and consequently into the by-product theory. The maintenance of 
the beliefs and practices entailed by those theories also implies a group-level 
perspective. 
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